FRAX offers liquidity providers to lock their position for up to 3 years and, in exchange, get higher rewards. Users forfeit accessing their money because they expect to get some rewards until they can unlock it, higher rewards than those who have the freedom to leave at any point.
However, in some cases, the protocol has stopped incentivizing a pool. This means that users are stuck there and do not receive rewards anymore. This is unfair to the user. If the protocol stops adding rewards to that pool, they have trapped the user for up to 3 years in exchange for just some initial rewards.
Although this may seem beneficial short-term to the protocol, it is not even that positive, as pools not receiving rewards are generally those with minimal volume. But, especially, this is a terrible long-term approach, as those unhappy users are not going to lock ever again, or may even avoid every FRAX product.
If the protocol stops rewarding a pool, it is only fair to let those locked users exit it. Why do you offer 3 years locks otherwise? If you want users to commit long-term but do not want to keep rewarding a pool, you could think of other formulas, like bonds.
I am posting this not just because I am locked for over 2 years in a Convex FRAX pool that is not getting any rewards, but because I am also providing liquidity in several others with a minimum lock because, after this bad experience, I am scared of being stuck in those with no yield. I doubt that is beneficial for the protocol. You want me to stay there long-term, but I can only do so if I can expect to be treated fairly, which is not the case as of now.
Before making a specific proposal, I wanted to create this topic so we can talk about it. In my opinion, it is fine if the protocol decides to stop rewarding a pool but, in that case, users should be allowed to exit from it.