Authorization for revoting failed FIPs that have surpassed the quorum with a cool-down period.
Background and Details
In Frax Finance, we value our veFXS holders’ time and opinion and stand by all votes that reach quorum, even if they are rejections. But in the unlikely case that one of these proposals was rejected when it should not have been for any reason, this proposal creates an opportunity to revote.
We propose a dynamic cool-down period for revoting failed FIPs that have surpassed the quorum with the following conditions:
Vote Participation
Cool-Down Period for Revoting
1 x Quorum < Participation < 2 x Quorum
30 days
2 x Quorum < Participation < 3 x Quorum
60 days
3 x Quorum < Participation < 4 x Quorum
90 days
4 x Quorum < Participation < 5 x Quorum
120 days
5 x Quorum < Participation < 6 x Quorum
150 days
6 x Quorum < Participation
180 days
P.S. For FIPs that have not hit quorum once but met 90% of quorum, we still use the FIP-102 policy.
PROPOSAL
For: Authorization for revoting failed FIPs that have surpassed the quorum with a cool-down period.
This means if a rejected proposal uses its second chance and again is rejected or does not hit quorum, it can not be proposed again under any circumstance in any capacity or similarity.
Why should props only be revoted on once? As indicated in the recent vote on FIP-149 , it seems there are a large concentration of voting power that is misinformed and not engaged in the community . I think the perceived issue here is fully mitigated by the fact that governance proposals can only be made by a single person on snapshot.
In my opinion your solving the wrong problem here in the current design you can use your judgment to filter out spam.
What Frax really needs and what would actually address any sort of spam and need for bureaucracy around voting rules is a proper governance system where proposers are required to deposit in order to submit proposals and where there are three voting options , yes, no, and veto , where veto confiscates a deposit. This is consistent with native goverance on cosmos , and would further decentralize Frax.
There’s lots of out of the box solutions that address this such as enterprise.money and probably some other ETH native solutions. I think openzepplin also has some governance contracts , but im not sure if they support Veto which is important to prevent spam and malicious props.
This is factually wrong, though. We don’t make opinionated judgments on the proposals. As long as they are properly written and the proposer wants to go for a snapshot vote after the discussion period, we’ve moved forward with them.
I think there are different designs for a governance process, and we have chosen our current method. It’s not about literal spam. There needs to be some way for a final settlement on a specific proposal. If proposals can be continually proposed forever, you can never know anything about something’s status. which is not desirable for running a protocol with the size of Frax.
Also, I think paying for the proposal posting method will stop people with less capital from proposing useful ideas, which is again not desirable.
Finally, if you strongly think your proposed method is better than what we have, I would be happy to help you draft a proposal for it and see what our community thinks about it.
To be clear , I am saying that you have the ability to manually filter proposals not that you are.
If proposals can be continually proposed forever, you can never know anything about something’s status.
Can you give some examples of this ? Or examples or where policies have been voted on multiple times in succession resulting in an unclear status on a given issue?
I dont feel strongly about this in particular but I do not agree with this prop to limit proposals to only one revote.
In the example of FIP 149 , the proposal was rejected , the reason is unclear but i think most Frax users would agree that this should pass , otherwise the community is going to void 13m worth of Frax on Moonriver for no reason. A single voter fraxmaxi.eth voted no with 6.7 million FXS , after many attempts to understand the reasoning here it is still unclear, there has be no dialog on discord or here in the forums. I find it pretty odd that an actor that has roughly 10% of the total FXS supply does not engage with the community when voting no on an important prop. This is not indicative of healthy governance .
Which is why i think revoting especially in cases like this are important. And while i think if FIP 149 went up for vote again it would pass I cant imagine the scenario where it didnt pass and because of this rule it cannot be revoted on. Especially in a case where the few voters who control the vote dont engage in community dialog. As an alternative, perhaps there could be some sort of offchain, non weighted sentiment voting that occurs before a prop is revoted on?
I think this is way too draconic. I get your proposal and the cooldown period with participation mechanism is cool. So why don’t we put something like 180 days for next revote +increase the quorum on the third and following vote to make it harder so you avoid spam but don’t limit it cause u know thing are dynamic and what once seemed like bad idea might actually work in the future.
If a vote has passed and was rejected with atleast 1x quorum but less than 2x quorum it can be revoted on after 30 days. Quorum is the threshold a prop needs in order for the votes to be considered.
This updated prop allows a prop to be revoted on unlimited times with the prescribed cooldown period in the chart above.
And we have interest to know how core team voted on FIP149, and why core team did not put out a Moonriver Ferry proposal but did that force every other chains